Mizrahi, Moti

Assistant Professor of Philosophy
Arts and Communication, School of

Moti Mizrahi received his PhD from the Graduate Center of the City University of New York in 2010. Before joining the School of Arts and Communication at Florida Institute of Technology, he taught at St. John’s University in New York City. He has teaching and research interests in argumentation, epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, philosophy of religion, and philosophy of science. 

Educational Background

PhD, Philosophy, The Graduate Center, City University of New York, 2010

Current Courses

HUM 2051 Civilization 1

HUM 2510 Logic

HUM 2570 Bioethics

HUM 3551 Ancient & Medieval Philosophy

HUM 3552 Modern & Contemporary Philosophy

Selected Publications

Mizrahi, Moti (forthcoming). Skeptheism: Is Knowledge of God’s Existence Possible? European Journal for Philosophy of Religion.
Mizrahi, Moti (forthcoming). Transcendental Arguments, Conceivability, and Global vs. Local Skepticism. Philosophia:1-15.
Mizrahi, Moti (forthcoming). The History of Science as a Graveyard of Theories: A Philosophers’ Myth? International Studies in the Philosophy of Science.
Mizrahi, Moti (forthcoming). What’s so bad about Scientism? Social Epistemology.
Mizrahi, Moti (2017). The Fine-Tuning Argument and the Simulation Hypothesis. Think 46 (16).
Moti, Mizrahi (2017). Why Gettier Cases Are Still Misleading: A Reply to Atkins. Logos and Episteme 8 (1):129-139.
Mizrahi, Moti (2016). An Argument for External World Skepticism from the Appearance/Reality Distinction. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (4):368-383.
Mizrahi, Moti (2016). Historical Inductions, Unconceived Alternatives, and Unconceived Objections. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 47 (1):59-68.
Mizrahi, Moti (2016). Why Arguments from Expert Opinion are still Weak: A Reply to Seidel. Informal Logic 36 (2):238-252.
Mizrahi, Moti (2016). Why be an Intellectually Humble Philosopher? Axiomathes 26 (2):205-218.
Mizrahi, Moti (2016). Why Gettier Cases are misleading. Logos and Episteme 7 (1):31-44.
Mizrahi, Moti (2016). Why Simpler Arguments are Better. Argumentation 30 (3):247-261.
Mizrahi, Moti (2015). A Reply to Patton's "Incommensurability and the Bonfire of the Meta-Theories". Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4 (10):51-53.
Mizrahi, Moti (2015). A Reply to James Marcum’s “What’s the Support for Kuhn’s Incommensurability Thesis?”. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4 (11):21-24.
Mizrahi, Moti (2015). A theory of argumentation. Metascience 24 (3):503-506.
Mizrahi, Moti (2015). Comment on David Kaspar's Intuitionism. Reason Papers 37 (2):26-35.
Mizrahi, Moti (2015). Don't Believe the Hype: Why Should Philosophical Theories Yield to Intuitions? Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 34 (3):141-158.
Mizrahi, Moti (2015). Historical Inductions: New Cherries, Same Old Cherry-picking. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 29 (2):129-148.
Mizrahi, Moti (2015). Kuhn’s Incommensurability Thesis: What’s the Argument? Social Epistemology 29 (4):361-378.
Mizrahi, Moti (2015). On appeals to intuition: a reply to Muñoz-Suárez. The Reasoner 9 (2):12-13.
Mizrahi, Moti (2015). Ought, Can, and Presupposition: An Experimental Study. Methode 4 (6):232-243.
Mizrahi, Moti (2015). Ought, Can, and Presupposition: A Reply to Kurthy and Lawford-Smith. Methode 4 (6):250-256.
Mizrahi, Moti (2015). Three Arguments Against the Expertise Defense. Metaphilosophy 46 (1):52-64.
Mizrahi, Moti & Morrow, David R. (2015). Does Conceivability Entail Metaphysical Possibility? Ratio 28 (1):1-13.
Mizrahi, Moti (2014). Against Phenomenal Conservatism: a Reply to Moretti. The Reasoner 8 (3):26.
Mizrahi, Moti (2014). Are Seemings Trustworthy? A Reply to Piazza. The Reasoner 8 (9):100-101.
Mizrahi, Moti (2014). Constructive Empiricism: Normative or Descriptive? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (4):604-616.
Mizrahi, Moti (2014). Does the Method of Cases Rest on a Mistake? Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2):183-197.
Mizrahi, Moti (2014). Essentialism: Metaphysical or Psychological? Croatian Journal of Philosophy 14 (40):65-72.
Mizrahi, Moti (2014). Phenomenal Conservatism and Self-defeat Arguments: A Reply to Huemer. Logos and Episteme 5 (3):343-350.
Mizrahi, Moti (2014). Phenomenal Conservatism, Justification, and Self-defeat. Logos and Episteme 5 (1):103-110.
Mizrahi, Moti (2014). The Problem of Natural Inequality: A New Problem of Evil. Philosophia 42 (1):127-136.
Mizrahi, Moti (2014). The Problem of Unconceived Objections. Argumentation 28 (4):425-436.
Mizrahi, Moti & Buckwalter, Wesley (2014). The Role of Justification in the Ordinary Concept of Scientific Progress. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 45 (1):151-166.
Mizrahi, Moti (2013). Against Phenomenal Conservatism. The Reasoner 7 (10):117-118.
Mizrahi, Moti (2013). Why the argument from zombies against physicalism is question-begging. The Reasoner 7 (8):94-95.
Mizrahi, Moti (2013). More Intuition Mongering. The Reasoner 7 (1):5-6.
Mizrahi, Moti (2013). New Puzzles About Divine Attributes. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (2):147-157.
Mizrahi, Moti (2013). On Proving Too Much. Acta Analytica 28 (3):353-358.
Mizrahi, Moti (2013). The Argument from Underconsideration and Relative Realism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (4):393-407.
Mizrahi, Moti (2013). The Pessimistic Induction: A Bad Argument Gone Too Far. Synthese 190 (15):3209-3226.
Mizrahi, Moti (2013). Why Arguments from Expert Opinion are Weak Arguments. Informal Logic 33 (1):57-79.
Mizrahi, Moti (2013). Why Hypothetical Syllogism is Invalid for Indicative Conditionals. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):40-43.
Mizrahi, Moti (2013). What is Scientific Progress? Lessons from Scientific Practice. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 44 (2):375-390.
Mizrahi, Moti (2012). A Decision Procedure for Evaluating Natural Language Arguments. APA Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy 12 (1):11-12.
Mizrahi, Moti (2012). Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Can’ from an Epistemic Point of View? Philosophia 40 (4):829-840.
Mizrahi, Moti (2012). Idealizations and scientific understanding. Philosophical Studies 160 (2):237-252.
Mizrahi, Moti (2012). Intuition Mongering. The Reasoner 6 (11):169-170.
Mizrahi, Moti (2012). Why the ultimate argument for scientific realism ultimately fails. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):132-138.
Mizrahi, Moti (2012). Why the ultimate argument for scientific realism ultimately fails. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 43 (1):132-138.
Mizrahi, Moti (2011). A Pedagogical Challenge in Teaching Arguments for the Existence of God. APA Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy 11 (1):10-12.
Mizrahi, Moti (2010). Take My Advice—I Am Not Following It: Ad Hominem Arguments as Legitimate Rebuttals to Appeals to Authority. Informal Logic 30 (4):435-456.
Mizrahi, Moti (2009). ‘Ought’ Does Not Imply ‘Can’. Philosophical Frontiers 4 (1):19-35.